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A NEVER-ENDING STUDY
Gray, Colin S. Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice. Cass Strategy and History Series, 15. New
York: Routledge, 2006. 234pp. $41.95

This volume is largely successful not
only in emphasizing the continuity and
wisdom of Colin Gray’s long-standing
defense of the study of strategy but in
capturing his delight in skewering the
latest intellectual fads in both American
and British security theory. Strategy and
History is a rich and occasionally provocative read for any student of strategy, military issues, or international
relations, and it reinforces the need to
study strategy—the relationship between military force and desired political objectives.
The introduction and very brief conclusion can stand alone as a valuable
beginning to the study of strategy and
its core themes. The first section examines the key issues in strategic studies—
the meaning of strategy itself and the
crucial use of history as a tool to understand strategy and think strategically.
The second section examines major
contemporary debates in the field of international security—nuclear targeting
and deterrence in the 1970s, the revolution in military affairs (RMA) debate of
the 1990s, and the broader issue of
arms control. The third, and arguably
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most adventurous, section illustrates
the multidisciplinary nature of strategy,
looking at geography, culture, and ethics. The first section—representing
Gray’s lifelong defense of the study of
strategy—is, not surprisingly, the strongest and most cogent; the other two
sections are more iconoclastic and, at
times, more difficult for the average
reader.
Section 1 contains five mutually reinforcing chapters, clearly articulating not
only the inherent difficulty in serious
study of strategy but its immense and
ongoing relevance for the academic,
policy maker, and war fighter. The first
chapter, written in the 1970s, attacks
the Cold War study of strategy in the
United States as both ahistorical and
technologically determinist—a theme
Gray has continued to hammer relentlessly (and properly) throughout his career. This chapter, combined with the
second essay in section 2 (on the RMA
debate) and Hew Strachan’s recent article in Survival on the co-optation of the
concept of strategy, constitutes a devastating counterargument to many of the
core assumptions of current American
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strategic thought, in both academe and
the policy world. The second chapter
addresses both the strengths and weaknesses of “new security” thinking in academe in the 1990s. This chapter could
be of particular value to political scientists and international relations
specialists.
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters of
this section should be required reading
for the modern war fighter and other
practitioners. These sections focus on
the importance of seapower and maritime strategy, on the enormous complexities involved in making strategy,
and on the paradoxes inherent in the
principles of war and in efforts to adapt
them to the changing international environment. Gray notes that the principles of war are actually principles of
warfare—intimately connected with the
tactical and operational levels of war
but remote from the fundamental issue
of waging war to achieve political ends.
The second and third sections do not
quite achieve the high standards of the
first. The second section’s focus on nuclear strategy, on the RMA debate, and
on arms control may seem antiquated
to today’s reader. Nevertheless, the notions that the RMA debate failed to
consider adversary responses to American technological superiority and that
arms control “is as likely to fuel political antagonism as prevent or alleviate
it” still have relevance to policy today.
The third section’s first chapter notes
the salient impact of geography on
strategy—an obvious point, perhaps,
but one exemplified most recently by
the problems of carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign in an Iraq with
insecure land borders on all sides. The
third chapter is a laudable effort to explain morality and ethics in international
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relations from the viewpoint of a neoclassical realist. The middle chapter, on
strategic culture, is the most daring,
and in some respects the most disappointing. Gray attempts to make a very
complex argument regarding the definition of strategic culture, but much of
the chapter is focused on a debate with
Iain Johnston, which readers unfamiliar
with this literature may find particularly daunting. This unusual chapter,
however, does not detract from the
overall value of the volume, which is
excellent not only as an introduction to
those unfamiliar with the study of strategy but also as a useful addition to the
libraries of practitioners, academics,
and military officers.
TIMOTHY D. HOYT

Naval War College

Haqqani, Husain. Pakistan: Between Mosque and
Military. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. 380pp.
$17.95

Five years into the U.S.-led global war
on terror, Pakistan remains a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in defeating the
Taliban and rooting out al-Qa‘ida. Despite the importance of Pakistan, it is a
country that poses challenges for the
United States. A key challenge is the
dominant role of the military, which
seeks to balance its commitments as a
valuable U.S. partner with its role as
a guardian of the country’s Islamic
identity through its close relationship
with Pakistan’s religious establishment.
How Pakistan manages these commitments has serious implications for U.S.
policy. Fortunately, Husain Haqqani
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has come to our aid to help us understand this complex political dynamic.
Haqqani has an insider’s view of Pakistani politics, having served as an adviser to three prime ministers, a
diplomat, a political commentator, and
a scholar of South Asian politics at the
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. This experience well qualifies
him to guide the reader through the
complex and, at times, confusing relationship between the Pakistan military,
the civil bureaucracy, and the religious
establishment.
Haqqani chronicles the early struggles
for Pakistan’s formation and makes a
convincing case that the lack of a clear
vision for Pakistan’s identity in the
early period of independence opened
the door for the military, the civil bureaucracy, and Islamic ideologues to
play dominant roles in Pakistan’s political culture. The largely secular ruling
establishment acknowledged Islam as
the symbol of unity but did not define
how Islam would manifest itself within
society. What were the limits (if any)
on religion in politics? How would relations between Muslims and other religious groups be managed if Islam was
the defining idea of Pakistan? Whose
interpretation of Islam would dominate
the new country? Questions such as
these were never confronted; the new
leadership was too preoccupied with
others, such as establishing a government, developing an economy, raising
an army, and developing a civil
bureaucracy.
Haqqani explains how the inability of
Pakistan’s founders to delineate Islam’s
place in society turned the faith into a
political tool for successive military and
civilian leaders. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s secular civilian prime minister
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in the 1970s, began the cynical employment of Islam in politics by attempting
to cross it with socialism. It was Bhutto’s
courting of the Muslim clergy with “Islamic socialism” that opened the door
into politics for Pakistan’s religious
establishment.
Bhutto was overthrown in 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq, a man of strong religious
convictions. During his eleven-year rule
he transformed Pakistan’s identity
through a campaign of Islamization of
law and society. This process extended
throughout the military and spread to
the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, which came to be dominated by officers who believed in Zia’s aims. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided
Zia an opportunity to support selected
mujaheddin groups fighting the Soviets,
as long as they aligned with Zia’s religious views and vision for Afghanistan.
By the time Zia died in an unexplained
plane crash in 1988, Pakistan had, according to Haqqani, changed to an
“ideological state guided by a praetorian military.” The centers of power
were by now heavily Islamized, through
the influence of the religious establishment within the civil bureaucracy and
the military.
Haqqani argues that civilian leaders like
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif could
not reverse the Islamization of Pakistani politics. Instead, both of these
leaders tried to coexist with a military
heavily influenced by the religious establishment. Both leaders failed, because they eventually ran afoul of the
influential military establishment that
believed they threatened its position of
power.
As he skillfully explains these dynamics,
Haqqani also weaves in their effect on
the United States–Pakistan relationship.

3
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During the first decade after its chaotic
birth, Pakistan sought to form a strategic alliance with the United States. The
bilateral relationship during the Cold
War was based on U.S. interest in a
strong anti-Soviet ally in Asia and Pakistan’s desire for backing against India.
This incongruence set up the two countries for misperceptions and unfulfilled
expectations that have lasted to the
present day.
The relationship was further complicated in the period after the Cold War
as U.S.-Pakistan ties frayed over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and
the Soviet threat disappeared. As the
United States began to scrutinize Pakistan more closely for democratic practices and nuclear proliferation, the
pro-American tilt within the Pakistani
military began to wane. A series of perceived slights (such as Washington’s refusal to deliver F-16 aircraft after
Pakistan had paid for them) and the effective cessation of the bilateral military
relationship contributed to this collective attitude. Although the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 resurrected
the relationship, it remains to be seen
whether the current bilateral cooperation can be sustained for the long term,
given the various pressures that the current president, General Pervez Musharraf,
is facing.
Haqqani ends the book with a chapter
that summarizes his findings and offers
suggestions for U.S. policy. Although
his diagnosis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is sound, we would benefit from
a bit more detail about some of his policy proposals. That is a minor shortcoming; Haqqani has provided an
excellent work on understanding the
nexus between Pakistan’s religious establishment and military, and on the
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implications of this relationship for Pakistan’s future.
AMER LATIF

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Director, South Asian Affairs

Brown, Malcolm, ed. T. E. Lawrence in War and
Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of
Lawrence of Arabia. London: Greenhill, 2005.
320pp. $39.95

This is a timely book. It is a collection
of rarely read wartime reports and post–
World War I articles that wrestle with
the consequences of war and were written by the British officer T. E. Lawrence,
otherwise known as Lawrence of Arabia, one of the greatest theoreticians
and practitioners of modern guerrilla
warfare.
Lawrence, of course, is best known for
his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
which describes the British-inspiredand-supported Arab revolt against their
Ottoman suzerain. Lawrence is back in
vogue again, which is not surprising
given the involvement of the United
States in a seemingly intractable and
protracted insurgency in Iraq. Many officers, officials, and academics are turning to The Seven Pillars of Wisdom for
nuggets of information about insurgency warfare, or, indeed, about the
Arabs themselves. In his foreword, Professor Michael Clarke of King’s College
London says that the book “has become
an oft-consulted work among military
officers presently struggling with the attempt to create order in Iraq.” The
Seven Pillars of Wisdom is wonderful
prose, but as Malcolm Brown puts it,
the work is “no pushover even for the
most adept of skim-readers.” It is in

4
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fact more often quoted than read, and I
suspect few people get much beyond its
key chapter on the principles of insurgent warfare.
That is where this collection comes in.
It is not only timely, given the renewed
interest in this unorthodox officer and
his theories on guerrilla warfare, but extremely valuable for Lawrence’s indepth analyses of the military situation
in the Arabian Peninsula and of the differing fighting styles of an irregular force
like the Bedouins and a conventional
modern army like that of the Turks.
The book’s first section is a valuable
and detailed introduction by the editor,
putting Lawrence into historical context as a guerrilla warfare theorist and
practitioner. The heart of the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 shows us
Lawrence caught up in the rigors and
challenges of war. It consists of his dispatches on the irregular war in the peninsula that appeared in a British intelligence
publication in Cairo, the Arab Bulletin—a
periodical that thanks to Lawrence and
many colleagues was not sullied by turgid,
army-style language.
Two superb dispatches in part 1 are essential for officers who want to understand irregular warfare. The first, titled
“Military Notes,” was written in November 1916. It brilliantly lays out the
strengths and weaknesses of the irregular Arab forces facing the Turks. Understand their weaknesses and make use of
their strengths and advantages, is what
Lawrence is saying about these Arab
units. The second dispatch, “Twentyseven Articles,” written in August 1917,
tells how to deal with the Hejaz Arabs. It
warns, “Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art,
not a science, with exceptions and no
obvious rules.” (The Hejaz is the northwestern coastal zone of present-day
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Saudi Arabia, where most of Lawrence’s
campaigning took place.) This piece has
come to the attention of many officers
serving in Iraq, particularly those in
advisory capacities with Iraqi forces and
officials. However, it is not clear that
they fully understand this caveat that
Lawrence attached: “They [the articles]
are meant only to apply to Bede [Bedouin]; townspeople or Syrians require
totally different treatment.” Clearly, the
Iraqis are different from the Syrians and
the Hejaz Arabs, whether Bedouin or urban dwellers. Lawrence makes clear the
tremendous value of understanding the
culture during war, something in which
the United States has been particularly
inept—not least in trying to suggest,
whether implicitly or explicitly, that
Lawrence’s twenty-seven articles might
unlock the secrets of Iraqi behavior.
Part 2 shows Lawrence trying to “cope
with the consequences of war in the circumstance of peace.” While much of it
is of historical interest, a number of
points are as interesting as the dispatches in part 1. I refer specifically to
“Demolitions under Fire” of January
1919, which discusses the Arab insurgents’ extensive use of sabotage against
Turkish infrastructure in the Arabian
Peninsula, particularly against the strategically important Hejaz Railway and
its bridges. Equally informative is “Mesopotamia: The Truth about the Campaign” (August 1920); it brilliantly and
scathingly castigates the British for their
failures and their lies in Mesopotamia, a
territory captured from the Ottomans
and now known as Iraq. However, the
two most important articles here are
“Evolution of a Revolt,” written in October 1920, and “Science of Guerilla
Warfare,” 1929. Both are readily available elsewhere, including online, but
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Malcolm Brown has done a great service for those interested in Lawrence’s
ideas by including them here.
In conclusion, this is a superb addition
to the literature on guerrilla warfare. I
enjoyed reading it. Lawrence’s prose
and clarity of thinking and exposition
made it doubly enjoyable.
AHMED HASHIM

Naval War College

Symonds, Craig L. Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2005. 378pp. $30

What history buff could possibly resist
the subtitle “Five Naval Battles That
Shaped American History”? Those so
enticed will not be disappointed in
Craig Symond’s exceptionally well written and fascinating accounts of these
American naval battles: Oliver Hazard
Perry’s far-reaching victory over the
British in the 10 September 1813 battle
for Lake Erie; the 8–9 March 1862 battle of Hampton Roads (which ended in
a draw) between America’s first ironclad ships, USS Monitor and CSS Virginia; the 1 May 1898 battle of Manila
Bay; the 4 June 1942 battle of Midway;
and the 18 April 1988 Operation PRAYING MANTIS in the Persian Gulf.
Because the American navy was absent,
Symonds does not list the most crucial
naval battle in American history, the
early September 1781 battle of the
Capes, in which a French fleet prevented the British from resupplying
Lord Charles Cornwallis’s besieged
troops at Yorktown. Nonetheless, he
provides a detailed account of this battle, describing it as “the battle that
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secured American independence.”
Symonds places special emphasis on
crucial command decisions. In this
case, he notes, for example, that at a
critical moment the British commander, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves,
hoisted a flag signal whose ambiguity
resulted in failure to concentrate the
fleet’s fire on the French, who in large
measure prevailed because of this
blunder.
This book’s considerable historical
value resides as much in Symonds’s
highly interesting and detailed description of the British background as in the
actual battles. For example, most of us
learned in school that impressment by
the British of American sailors into the
Royal Navy was the prime cause of war
in 1812—but I was surprised to read
here that some ten thousand were so
impressed. While we all knew about
Perry’s victory at Lake Erie and his famous report, “We have met the enemy
and he is ours,” few have a true idea of
its significance. In Symonds’s words,
“Perry’s victory secured the northwestern frontier for the United States”—the
threat that greatly concerned us.
Symonds’s descriptions of the conditions in which men fought at sea are
also masterful. This is especially so in
his comparison of the conditions on
sailing ships with those of the ironclads,
Monitor and Virginia.
Symonds notes that in terms of casualties Virginia inflicted before Monitor’s
arrival “the worst defeat in the history
of the United States Navy until Pearl
Harbor.” The episode clearly spelled the
end of an era in naval warfare. The lopsided 1898 victory over the Spanish at
Manila Bay, for its part, left the United
States “an acknowledged world power”

6
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and an “empire.” The close-run victory
at Midway confirmed the primacy of
aircraft carriers and ensured U.S. control of the western Pacific. PRAYING
MANTIS was thrown in mainly to demonstrate that new U.S. weapons do
work—albeit, in this case, against a
rather feeble Iranian foe. Curiously,
Symonds fails to note that a few months
earlier, the battleship USS Iowa had dramatically demonstrated a far greater
peacekeeping capability than the extensive, missile-equipped fleet he described.
WILLIAM LLOYD STEARMAN

Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee on
Naval History

Divila, Tony, Marc J. Epstein, and Robert
Shelton. Making Innovation Work: How to Manage It, Measure It, and Profit from It. Upper Saddle
River, N.J.: Wharton School, 2006. 334pp. $29.99

Innovation is one of the four pillars of
the U.S. Defense Department’s Transformation Plan. Innovation has nudged
its way into the mission statements and
strategies of most business and government organizations, because it is essential for competitive positioning and
sustained performance. Yet in spite of
executive proclamations and substantial
investment, a majority of organizations
report disappointing innovation results.
Making Innovation Work does a thorough job of converting the concept of
innovation into a practical management framework. Although the book is
research-based and two of its authors
are academics, it provides practical
tools and techniques for managing the
end-to-end innovation process. It also
debunks several innovation myths, such
as creativity and management discipline
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being incompatible. Examples and vocabulary are clearly geared to a business
audience. There are several excellent
books on military innovation, but most
are analytical and retrospective. This is
a “hands on” book about the management of innovation, and leaders of national security organizations will
appreciate the relevance of the book’s
framework.
This book is geared to leaders who
manage innovation in large successful
organizations. Paradoxically, large successful organizations typically have the
weakest innovation results, because innovation requires deviation from the
practices and technology that have
served them so well over the years. At
times the book becomes a bit repetitive,
and word or phrase usage can become
confusing, but the liberal use of graphics and text boxes to deliver important
insights, examples, and models is quite
effective.
The authors’ innovation model is a
four-cell matrix. The two axes (Technology, Business Model) are subdivided
into “New” and “Existing.” The four
cells categorize distinct types of innovation, labeled “Incremental,” “Business
Model Semi-Radical,” “Technology
Semi-Radical,” and “Radical.” An innovation project utilizing existing technology but employing a new way of
conducting business is categorized as
“Semi-Radical.” An example is iPod/
iTunes, which uses existing technology
but dramatically alters the way music is
acquired. This type of product is called
a “disruptive innovation.” It fundamentally changes the marketplace and
the organization’s competitive position
in it. The authors’ premise is that the
category of innovation is an important
consideration, since it sets the stage for
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what the organization must commit in
resources, capabilities, and management tools. For instance, incremental
innovation reapplies existing technology and business practices. It can be delivered in a shorter time with less
expense than radical or semiradical
innovation, but it lacks the punch for
competitive repositioning.
The authors’ working definition of innovation is capturing creativity and
then adding value so it benefits the organization. Their innovation framework
is a sequence of integrated management
decisions and actions. The first and
most important decision is determining
whether the innovation project is
aligned with the organization’s strategy
and capabilities. There is extensive discussion about modifying an organization’s culture so that it can sustain
innovation. Every organization has
what the authors call “antibodies,”
those rules, attitudes, procedures, and
habits that insidiously suffocate new
ideas. Leadership must provide management systems to support the innovation process, such as mechanisms to
capture and evaluate creative ideas, ensure adequate resources, measure progress, and reward personnel. The authors
repeatedly emphasize that the integrity
of the innovation process and the results reflect leadership’s skill and
commitment.
The audience for this book is business
executives. However, military and national security leaders will find practical
recommendations and management
techniques applicable for their mission.
The book contains an extensive bibliography and references.
HANK KNISKERN

Naval War College
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Seiple, Robert A., and Dennis R. Hoover, eds. Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International
Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,
2004. 198pp. $65.00 cloth/$22.95 paper

Those serving in the military and foreign service stereotypically show scant
professional interest in religion. Presumably the security and interests of
states hinge on secular concerns.
Merging religion with politics only
complicates matters, often inviting violence, as wars of religion or terrorist
acts of militant Islamists remind us. Religion and Security innovatively complicates such Westphalian dispositions,
urging readers to appreciate the religious complexities of today’s global security environment and to consider the
possibilities that constructive religious
engagement offers for citizens and
states the world over. Yes, religion is
part of the problem, we are reminded,
but it is part of the solution as well.
“There is, quite simply,” the book argues in toto, “a positive nexus between
religion and security, and the international community ignores it at its considerable peril.” Why we have been slow
to come to this conclusion is hypothesized in the first chapter, by strategicstudies expert Pauletta Otis.
Editors Robert Seiple and Dennis
Hoover have assembled a dynamic and
diverse array of scholars, practitioners,
and experts from many fields and political walks of life. Seiple, former U.S.
ambassador at large for International
Religious Freedom, and Hoover both
belong to the Institute for Global Engagement, the “think tank with legs.”
They have divided the book into four
sections, examining religion’s relationship to violence and insecurity, pluralism
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and political stability, military intervention and conflict resolution, and human
freedoms and civil society. Collectively,
the book’s fourteen chapters convey the
point that theology, scripture, ethics,
and religious studies contribute essential resources to global stability and a
mature understanding of international
affairs. Several overarching themes hold
the book together; only a few underrunning concerns common to edited
volumes impede its steep ambitions.
Foremost, the contributors caution readers about the inadequacies of traditional
realist paradigms. An overdetermined
realpolitik not only obstructs religious
concerns from political view but depletes the ethical resources that often
flow from religious ideas. See especially
chapters by Robert Seiple and ethicist
Jean Bethke Elshtain, who draw respectively from scripture and the just-war
tradition to argue forcefully for responsible civic engagement on behalf of victims of atrocities. Several essays point
up that it is hardly “realistic” to ignore
so potent a force of human identity and
motivation as religion. Kevin Hasson’s
political-philosophical analysis powerfully drills home the notion that any
sustainable political structure or system
must presuppose a “moral anthropology” or account of human nature in
which the “built-in thirst for the transcendent” can flourish and be protected. Historian Philip Jenkins’s essay
also argues for protecting religious freedom: societies that repress or eliminate
religious opposition often embolden
those they persecute, driving them underground, militarizing them, sacralizing
their persecution, and creating longterm animosities and insecurity. Where
Jenkins offers a wide range of examples,
an illuminating chapter by Chris Seiple
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and Joshua White casts a focused look
at Uzbekistan, a latent hotspot below
many people’s security radar screens.
Together, these authors showcase a central motif: when religious freedom is
jeopardized for some, political stability
is imperiled for many—a worry that
should consume any self-styled realist.
Reciprocally, as chapters by Christopher
Hall, Osman bin Bakar, and others reveal, when religious pluralism and tolerance are nurtured, political security is
made more certain.
A shared vision in this volume is the
need for a more comprehensive political outlook than political realism customarily affords. Various authors issue
calls for a more “holistic,” inclusive,
and robust political ethic that extends
beyond a cramped view of states and
their rulers and interests by engaging
citizens, civic groups, and those who
struggle—often in the shadows, sometimes through force—for a place in the
political daylight. Given the era of globalization in which we dwell, an approach more attuned to dispersed
power structures is more realistic than
certain traditional forms that “hard”
geopolitics offer. Thus does Harold
Saunders (a twenty-year veteran of the
National Security Council) appeal for
an alternative paradigm of “relational
realism,” one that takes stock of the
“full complex of human interactions
that contribute to (or subvert) security.” Thus does Hall argue for the cultivation of “religious diplomacy” and
“diplomatic virtues,” echoing Douglas
Johnston, whose foreword proposes the
creation of religious attachés in the U.S.
Foreign Service. (The U.S. military
should follow suit.) Thus does Elshtain
elevate low realist expectations with a
tenable model of citizenship she labels
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“justice as equal regard”—the equal
right of besieged victims to have force
used on their behalf.
Those of us who serve or have served in
the military often draw our battle lines
starkly: black and white, good and evil,
us and them. This crucial book offers a
chastening reminder not only of the
many shades of gray needed to nuance a
view of religion as it relates to global security in a confusing new age but also
of the richly colorful tapestry woven by
religious ideas and approaches to political problems. If that doesn’t persuade,
then simply recall the book’s thesis: nations that respect religion’s role in the
world are far more secure than those
that do not.
JOHN D. CARLSON

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Arizona State University

Sawyer, Ralph D. The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence
Theory and Practice in Traditional China. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2004. 617pp.

Ralph Sawyer continues his work on
Chinese political and military writings
with The Tao of Spycraft. The title, however, may be somewhat misleading.
Rather than compartmentalizing intelligence separate from other endeavors,
Sawyer demonstrates how intelligence
is an integral aspect of war, diplomacy,
and politics.
A sampling of current war college articles shows a strong interest in “integrating all elements of national power,” for
which the Defense Department uses the
acronym DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Sawyer
demonstrates that this was a common
concept thousands of years ago in China.
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Diplomatic maneuvers, economic
inducements, propaganda, and whispering campaigns were all an essential
element of statecraft. Most important,
unlike our contemporary U.S. attitudes,
intelligence was not isolated as some
kind of supporting activity or a commodity accessed when needed but an
integral part of all state activities.
The book is divided into six parts: Early
History, Spycraft, Covert Activities,
Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence,
Military Intelligence, and Prognostication, Divination, and Nonhuman Factors. Each part contains several topical
chapters, each rich with examples from
Chinese history. For example, part 4
(Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence), chapter 10 (“Basic Theory and
Issues”) provides a primer on critical
thinking and evaluation as good as any
contemporary U.S. intelligence text. It
addresses analytic biases and prejudices,
how to judge the reliability and credibility of sources, how to make assessments on limited information, and
confidence levels of assessments—all issues the intelligence community must
continually address.
Several common concepts run the
length of the book. The first is the integration of intelligence into statecraft.
Another is the view that intelligence is
essentially a human endeavor. The
statesman, the general, and the spymaster must understand both human
nature in general and the personalities
of their colleagues, allies, and enemies
in particular.
This work is not without flaws. It cries
out for maps, especially political maps
of the “Spring and Autumn” and “Warring States” periods. The book assumes
that the reader has a basic understanding of traditional Chinese history and
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culture; some sections may be hard going for the casual reader. Parts of the
book are rather dry; this reflects the extensive translations more than the author’s style. But for serious students of
China, intelligence tradecraft, or information operations, this book provides
essential understanding of contemporary Chinese statecraft.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)
Centreville, Va.

Graham, Euan. Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940–
2004: A Matter of Life and Death? New York:
Routledge, 2006. 320pp. $115

As the first English-language analysis of
its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case
study fills a critical gap in the literature
concerning the maritime dimension of
Japanese national security. This is an
exciting issue at a dynamic time: in
October 2004, Japan’s Maritime SelfDefense Force (MSDF) and coast guard
led Northeast Asia’s first Proliferation
Security Initiative exercise. In the Indian Ocean, the MSDF is currently fuelling allied vessels to support operations
in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Japan is
struggling to assert control over its exclusive economic zones, the boundaries
of which are increasingly contested by
China and South Korea.
Graham (currently a British government researcher at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office’s North Asia and
Pacific Research Group) draws on fresh,
original sources, including Japaneselanguage documents and interviews
with Japanese officials, to demonstrate
that while Japan’s defense and foreign
policy have changed dramatically since
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its opening up to the world in 1853,
sea-lane security has been an enduring
national security concern. Graham offers insight into Japanese leaders’ and
analysts’ perceptions of their nation’s
own security context, thereby avoiding
the tendency of much related scholarship to view matters exclusively through
the prism of relations with the United
States.
Graham situates resource-poor Japan in
its geographic context: “Although at
nearly 30,000 km, Japan’s coastline is
one-third longer than that of the
United States, no inland point is more
than 150 km from the sea.” He explains
Japan’s historical concern with the security of its sea lines of communication
(SLOC), citing official Diet testimony
that “the greatest cause of [Japan’s
World War II] defeat was the loss of
shipping” to the Allied blockade. Graham
records a recent manifestation of Japanese SLOC concerns: Prime Minister
(1996–98) Ryutaro Hashimoto’s worry
that “many commercial flights and aircraft [were] forced to divert around
those areas affected” by China’s March
1996 missile tests, during which “some
of the missiles landed in waters only 60
km from [Japan’s] Yonaguni island.”
Graham’s analysis is well written, organized, and documented; based on numerous, very current data; and highly
accessible to the reader. It is thus an essential reference for analysts of East
Asian security.
Given this significant achievement, one
hopes that Graham and other scholars
will conduct follow-up research concerning such areas relevant to Japan’s
future SLOC security as China’s maritime legal and naval development. Some
assessments may need to be revisited as
additional data becomes available. For
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instance, while Graham suggests that
China’s Song diesel submarine program
may have “fail[ed] . . . to develop according to schedule,” it is now noteworthy the extent to which Song
development appears to have progressed in parallel to China’s importing
of Kilo diesel submarines from Russia.
Graham projects that SLOC security
will continue to preoccupy Japanese
planners as a fundamental national
concern. He breaks significant ground
by showing that Japanese policy makers, motivated by increasingly “realist”
threat perceptions, are exploring new
directions in the pursuit of SLOC security. The extent to which these emerging impulses can transcend funding
constraints (imposed increasingly by
demographic and economic challenges)
and constitutional limitations (still protected, to some degree, by domestic
politics) remains a pivotal question for
all concerned with East Asian security.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College

Johnson, Stephen P. Silent Steel: The Mysterious
Death of the Nuclear Sub USS Scorpion. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2006. 292pp. $25.95

Several years ago I received a phone call
from Stephen Johnson asking about my
service on the USS Scorpion (SSN 589),
my first ship, between the fall of 1961
and the winter of 1962. He explained he
was writing a book about its loss in late
May 1968 with its entire crew of ninetynine. I spoke with him at some length
and sent some material about the vast
“SubSafe” program changes that occurred within the Submarine Force after the loss of USS Thresher (SSN 593)
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in April 1963. Silent Steel is the exquisitely researched result of my tiny input
and that of more than 230 others—
ranging from the widows of Scorpion
sailors, submarine design engineers and
naval architects, and a list of activeduty and retired personnel that reads
like a “who’s who” of the then and now
Submarine Force. The bibliography itself spans two dozen pages of applicable
books, journal articles, official reports,
memorandums, and other miscellaneous correspondence.
Anyone expecting to find a clear and
unambiguous set of events and circumstances that “explain” the Scorpion’s
loss will be disappointed. Rather, along
with fascinating personal insights into
some key players, the reader will find
erudite and technically credible discussions on the facts and assumptions of
any number of popular and not so popular theories. For example, his dispassionate and objective examination of
much of the same material that was
available to formal Navy courts of inquiry virtually rules out any concept of
“hostile action” and substantially weakens the plausibility of incidents involving the ship’s own torpedoes. He subtly
chides some advocates for having
drawn three-significant-figure conclusions from one-significant-figure assumptions. In addition, by bluntly
describing some bureaucratic foibles
and tragic administrative decisions
(such as shortchanging Scorpion’s
SubSafe package during a 1967 refueling overhaul to save money), Johnson’s
work leads one to perceive that—as is
true in virtually all submarine disasters
that we know something about—there
had to have been some series of complicating, cascading events that overwhelmed any efforts by the crew to bring

12

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

War College: Book Reviews

the (perhaps minor) initiating casualty
under control. For those who delight in
finding small technical mistakes, there
are a few, if one looks closely enough—
for example, the Scorpion’s fire control
system was not a Mark 113 but a vintage Mark 101. But none detracts from
the overall high quality of the investigative effort.
Even without a specific “cause célèbre”
event to dissect and review for “lessons
learned,” Silent Steel provides much to
think about for anyone interested in or
involved with combating casualties at sea.
There is even some consolation, however small in comparison to the loss of
life, in the knowledge that the United
States has come to realize to a significant degree in the years since that “material readiness is a consumable”; we are
reluctant to run ships (and people) as
hard as we did in the early to mid-1960s.
When I rode Scorpion, it averaged more
than three hundred days a year at sea.
Today, even with dwindling platform
resources, the Submarine Force has begun to say no to many of the increasing
operational requirements from senior
regional and national commanders.
JAMES H. PATTON, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Keefer, Edward C., ed. Foreign Relations of the
U.S.: Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, vol. 6.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2006. 1,173pp. $65

This State Department volume, the first
of five that will cover the end period of
the Vietnam War, documents major
foreign policy issues of the Nixon administration, with a focus on U.S. policy toward Vietnam, Cambodia, and to
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a lesser extent Laos during the period of
January 1969 to July 1970. What a time
it was!
In the 1968 presidential campaign, candidate Richard M. Nixon stated that he
had a plan to end the war in Vietnam.
As it turned out, the “plan” was embryonic. When he took office he moved
slowly, convinced that how the United
States ended the war would have an enduring impact on future American foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s
national security adviser, became the
key figure in the effort to end the war, a
program that became known as
“Vietnamization.”
Vietnamization was directed toward the
upgrading of South Vietnamese forces,
which was to be accompanied by
phased withdrawals of U.S. forces.
Completion would depend on how
things went in Vietnam. This work, in
addition to documenting policy efforts
to move this program along, also documents efforts to convince Hanoi that it
was dealing with a strong adversary: for
example, secret U.S. bombing of Cambodia, integration of the secret war in
Laos with the conflict in Vietnam, and
covert operations against North
Vietnam.
One of the principal themes developed
here is the search for a negotiated settlement, first in the Paris Peace Talks and
then through secret meetings between
Kissinger and North Vietnamese foreign
minister Xuan Thuy and special adviser
Le Duc Tho. Here, and throughout the
book, Kissinger’s memorandums to
Nixon are the key documents. Many appear in Kissinger’s memoirs; however, in
this work they are more complete.
In March 1970, Cambodia’s Norodom
Sihanouk was overthrown by the Lon
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Nol government. For years enemy
sanctuaries and supply caches on the
border area of that country had been a
problem for Americans and South Vietnamese. Now there was a government
in Phnom Penh that would permit
something to be done about it. By April,
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
forces were mounting operations in the
former sanctuaries.
Soon the notion of American forces
participating in cross-border operations
was considered. The last third of this
book is dedicated to the Cambodian incursion, and here Keefer’s editorial
notes and footnotes are particularly
valuable. Some touch upon the U.S. domestic situation that developed in that
unforgettable spring of 1970: “On May
4, 1970 at approximately 4:45 p.m., the
President told Kissinger, ‘At Kent State
there were 4 or 5 killed today. But that
place has been bad for quite some
time.’” The footnote goes on to develop
related conversations through May 7.
This volume is an essential source for
anyone researching the period, in particular American foreign and military
policy toward Southeast Asia. Edward
Keefer has done an outstanding job in
bringing together and giving focus to
this vital aspect of American foreign
policy during the early Nixon
administration.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Professor Emeritus, University of Vermont

Anderson, Fred. The War That Made America: A
Short History of the French and Indian War. New
York: Viking, 2005. 293pp. $25.95
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“It is the nature of great events to obscure the great events that came before
them.” This memorable phrasing begins
nineteenth-century historian Francis
Parkman’s masterwork on the French
and Indian War, Montcalm and Wolfe.
One hundred twenty years later, Fred
Anderson’s The War That Made America clears away with lucid prose and effective narrative style the obscurity that
has veiled the French and Indian War.
Described as the “first world war” by
Winston Churchill, it was the fourth in
a series of six wars fought between England and France and their various allies
between 1689 and 1815. It enflamed
French Canada and British North
America from the Carolinas to Nova
Scotia, and it spread to Europe, the Caribbean, West Africa, India, and eventually to the Philippines. Despite this
nearly worldwide conflagration and the
approximately 800,000 total military
casualties that occurred in all theaters,
this conflict (also commonly known as
the Seven Years’ War) is no more familiar to most Americans than the
Peloponnesian War, according to
Anderson. His highly readable and concise history, primarily focused on the
fierce struggle from 1754 to 1760 between the British, the French, and numerous American Indian nations for
control of North America, elegantly
remedies this lack of familiarity.
Anderson, a history professor at the
University of Colorado and a former
Army infantry officer, is the author of
Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War
and the Fate of Empire in British North
America, 1754–1766, winner of the
Francis Parkman and Mark Lynton history prizes in 2001. The War That Made
America is a scaled-down telling of that
prize-winning epic; it is also a
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companion to a four-hour PBS television series of the same name. There is
plenty of history to write about in this
war and in the momentous clash of empires, usually viewed by Americans as
only hazy background to the American
Revolution. Throughout the first half of
the eighteenth century, the distribution
of power in the northern colonies had
been kept in balance by the powerful
Iroquois Confederacy, which skillfully
played the French against the British in
order to survive and thrive. But by
midcentury, colonial expansion and
land speculation, plus the Iroquois’
own miscalculations, had led to conflict. The initial confrontation was
sparked in a remote Allegheny glen by a
young George Washington, whose
small militia and Indian scouting party
had a brief firefight with a French reconnaissance force. From this spark
events were set in train that would see
early French successes but eventually
lead to a “most unequivocal” AngloAmerican victory (in large part enabled
by the Royal Navy), one that would destroy the American empire of France
and place the British crown at its zenith
after the Treaty of Paris was ratified in
1763.
Anderson, now perhaps the preeminent
historian of the French and Indian
War, relates this complex history in an
insightful and succinct account. From
the gilded halls of power—Whitehall
and Versailles—to the remote banks of
the Monongahela in the Ohio Valley,
the story and its principal participants
are clearly described. The key roles of
Indian leaders, such as the Delaware
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chief Teedyuscung, the Seneca chief
Tanaghrisson (the “Half King”), and
later the Ottawa war chief Pontiac, and
their political and war-fighting skills are
made unmistakably apparent. Numerous French and English military leaders,
including the Marquis de Montcalm
and Brigadier General James Wolfe,
struck down within minutes of each
other on the Plains of Abraham in
front of Quebec, are also effectively
portrayed. But Anderson’s story is
more than a chronological history,
along with its significant characters; it
is also the tale of cultural and intercultural interaction, with Indians and
their different tribal interests an integral part of it.
In the end, the war overturned the balance of power on two continents, essentially subjugated the Native
American nations and destroyed their
control of their own destinies and
lands, and lit the “long fuse” of the
American Revolution. Professor
Anderson’s skillful account of this rich
history is a cautionary story, pointing
out the unpredictability and irony that
attend war and the pursuit of power,
and how “even the most complete victories can sow the seeds of reversal and
defeat for victors too dazzled by success to remember that they are, in fact,
only human.” This excellent primer by
a distinguished historian makes a most
convincing case that the French and
Indian War transformed the colonists’
world forever, that “it is not too much
to call it the war that made America.”
WILLIAM CALHOUN

Naval War College
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